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STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-New Mexico Rejects
Apparent Authority to Consent as a Valid Basis for
Warrantless Searches: State v. Wright
I.

INTRODUCTION

In State v. Wright,' the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed
whether a warrantless search is valid when based on the consent of a
third party whom the police reasonably believed to possess common
authority over the premises. The court held that such consent was invalid
in New Mexico because the federal "apparent authority ' 2 exception
violated Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.' Therefore,
in Wright, the evidence discovered by officers who relied on the "apparent
authority" of a third party's consent to search a residence was suppressed.
Based on the Wright decision, if law enforcement officials do not have
sufficient basis to conclude that a third party has actual authority to
consent, they must obtain a warrant to search the premises or risk having
the seized evidence suppressed at trial. 4 This Note will provide an overview
of the evolution of the apparent authority to consent exception in both
federal and state law, examine the rationale of the Wright court, and
explore some of the implications of the court's decision.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 8th, 1992, two police officers arrived at Mark Allen's trailer
home "in response to a Crime Stoppers' tip ... that cocaine and
marijuana had been delivered to the trailer ... and were being divided

up for sale." 5 Shortly before this, the defendant, Derilee Wright, her
boyfriend, John A. Corman III, and Deidre Wertz, had arrived at the
trailer home. Wertz introduced Corman and the defendant to Allen who
gave them permission to use his back bedroom.

1. 119 N.M. 559, 893 P.2d 455 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 119 N.M. 389, 890 P.2d 1321 (1995).
2. The United States Supreme Court articulated the "apparent authority" exception in Illinois
v. Rodriguez. 497 U.S. 177 (1990). The United States Supreme Court held that a consent to search
given by a third party was valid for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, if the police reasonably
believed at the time of the search that the third party possessed the authority to consent. This
holding allows a third party to consent to a search even though they do not have authority to do
so. Id. at 188.
3. This section provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and effects, from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place, or seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the
persons or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation.
N.M. CoNST. art. II, § 10.
4. See Wright, 119 N.M. at 564-65, 893 P.2d at 460-61.
5. Id. at 561-62, 893 P..2d at 457-58. Unless otherwise cited, all subsequent references to the
facts of this case refer to Wright, 119 N.M. at 561-62, 893 P.2d at 457-58.
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Before the officers could knock on the door of the trailer, Wertz
opened it and said "Hi." After identifying themselves as police officers,
Officer Al Marchand asked Wertz if they could come inside. Wertz
responded by opening the door wider and stepping back. At this time
the officers did not know who owned the trailer or the vehicles parked
in front of it.
Officer Marchand asked Wertz if anyone else was in the trailer. She
replied that only she and her two children were there. She showed
Marchand that her children were sleeping in a bedroom. Marchand noticed
a light coming from under the door of another bedroom. He became
concerned for his and Officer Ted Eldridge's safety and asked Wertz if
anyone else was present. She replied that she did not think so. Marchand
asked if he could look, and she replied, "Oh, it's not my place but go
ahead." Marchand and Eldridge looked into the bedroom and saw drug
paraphernalia near Corman and the defendant. They placed both of them
under arrest. Eldridge then found cocaine on the defendant.
At trial, the defendant "moved to suppress the evidence seized by the
officers. The trial court ruled that Defendant lacked standing to object
to the search of the bedroom .... ,,6 Additionally, it found that before
beginning a search of the other rooms of the trailer, the officers "had
sufficient basis to conclude that Wertz had actual or apparent authority
' 7
to give her consent to a search of the residence.
The defendant appealed her convictions for conspiracy to traffic cocaine
and possession of drug paraphernalia.' She invoked the protection of
both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article
II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. 9 In determining whether
the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the
evidence, the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered two relevant
issues:' 0 1) whether the third-party consent authorizing the search was
valid;" and 2) whether the defendant had standing to challenge the
search. 2 The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized at the trailer." The
court concluded that an individual clothed with apparent authority to
consent to a search could not give lawful consent to law enforcement
officers to enter and search the premises of another. 4 Moreover, the
court held that the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the bedroom which could only be surrendered in the case of a co-occupant
of the bedroom. 5
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
search
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 562, 893 P.2d at 458.
Id.
Id. at 561, 893 P.2d at 457.
Id. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459.
The court also rejects the state's alternative argument that the search was reasonable as a
incident to a protective sweep. This issue, however, is beyond the scope of this note.
Wright, 119 N.M. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460.
Id. at 562, 893 P.2d at 458.
Id. at 565, 893 P.2d at 461.
Id.
Id. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459.
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HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

Federal Law-The Evolution of the Consent Exception
An individual's right to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is set out in the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-

A.

tution. 16 In Weeks v. United States, 7 the United States Supreme Court

held that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment was
inadmissible in federal criminal prosecutions. 8 The Weeks Court held
prosecution was a
that the use of illegally seized evidence in a criminal
19 In Mapp v. Ohio, 20
rights.
constitutional
defendant's
violation of the
the Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 21
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,22 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the proposition that voluntarily given consent is a valid exception
to the general presumption against warrantless searches.23 The Supreme
Court stated that a search conducted pursuant to valid consent is an
established exception to the requirements of both a warrant and probable
cause, under the Federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment.24 The issue
before the Schneckloth Court was: "what must the prosecution prove to

demonstrate that a consent was 'voluntarily' given?" ' 2 The Court noted
that a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less incon-

16. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
17. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18. Id. at 398.
19. Id.
20. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
21. See id. at 660. In Mapp, the United States Supreme Court held that all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
was now inadmissible in state criminal trials as well as in federal criminal trials. The Court noted
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected against state action not only
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures but also the right to have excluded from state
and federal criminal trials any evidence illegally seized. Id. There is some disagreement about whether
the exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
22. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In Schneckloth, a police officer had stopped a car for safety reasons.
The officer asked if he could search the car to which one passenger replied, "[slure, go ahead."
The officer found three stolen checks under the left rear seat. At trial, the defendant, Bustamonte,
moved to suppress the evidence found in the car and was denied. Id. at 219.
23. Id.
24. Id. The Supreme Court stated that:
It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments that a search
conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se unreasonable
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."
Id.
25. Id. at 223. In Schneckloth, the Court held that when the subject of a search is not in
custody, the State must prove that the consent was voluntarily given and not the result of duress
or coercion, express or implied. The Court went on to state that voluntariness is to be determined
from all the circumstances and while the subject's knowledge of her right to refuse consent is a
fact to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to show such knowledge as a
prerequisite to establishing voluntary consent. Id. at 227.
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venience to the subject of the search and, if properly conducted, is a
legitimate aspect of police activity. Additionally, where the police have
evidence about some illegal activity, but lack probable cause, a search
authorized by consent may be the only means of obtaining reliable
evidence. 26
1. The Emergence of "Common Authority": United States v.
27
Matlock

In United States v. Matlock, the United States Supreme Court set forth
the principle that a person who possesses common authority over a
premises may validly consent to a search. 2 The authority which justifies
third-party consent rests on the mutual use of property by persons having
joint access or mutual control for most purposes. 29 Common authority
is not implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the
property to be searched.30
The defendant in Matlock challenged a warrantless search executed by
officers who had secured the consent of a woman who said the premises
were jointly occupied by the defendant and herself.3 The issue was whether
the evidence presented by the United States with respect to the voluntary
consent of a third party to search the living quarters of the defendant
was legally sufficient to render the seized materials admissible in evidence
at the defendant's criminal trial.3 2 The Court held that the voluntary
consent of a joint occupant of a residence to search the premises jointly
occupied is valid against the co-occupant. 3 This holding allowed evidence
found in the State's search to be used against the defendant in his
3 4
criminal trial.

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the consent of an individual
who possesses common authority over the premises is valid against the
absent, non-consenting individual with whom that authority is shared.35
The absent defendant assumes this risk when he allows another to have
joint control of his premises or effects.3 6 The United States Supreme
Court ruled that when the State seeks to justify a warrantless search by
proof of voluntary consent it need not rely on proof of the defendant's
consent. The State may, instead, show that it obtained consent from a

26. Id. The Court noted in Schneckloth that the police lacked probable cause to search the car
and yet the search pursuant to consent yielded tangible evidence which served as a basis for
prosecution and assured that innocent parties were not brought to trial. Id.
27. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
28. Id. at 171.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 172 n.7.
31. Id. at 166.
32. Id. at 171-72.
33. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 169-70.
34. Id. The Court noted that the lower courts in Matlock, specifically the Seventh Circuit, which
had affirmed the district court's motion to suppress the evidence, had accepted this proposition.
Id. at 169.
35. Id. at 170.
36. Id. (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969)).
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third party who possessed common authority or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be searched.3 7 The Court
reversed the district court and the court of appeals and thus declined to
reach the "apparent authority" contention argued by the Government."
2. "Apparent Authority" to Consent: Illinois v. Rodriguez3 9
Sixteen years after Matlock, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether a warrantless search is valid when based upon the
consent of a third party whom police reasonably believed to possess
common authority over the premisesA0 In Rodriguez, the defendant was
4
arrested in his apartment and charged with possession of illegal drugs. 1
The officers had gained entry with the consent and assistance of a third
party who represented the defendant's apartment as "ours" said that she
42
had clothing and furniture there and unlocked the door with her key.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized at the time
of his arrest, claiming that the third party's consent was invalid because
4
she did not possess common authority over the premises. 1
The Court found that the prosecution did not sustain its burden of
proving that the third party who consented had common authority over
the premises." Nevertheless, the Court rejected the defendant's assertion
that permitting a reasonable belief of common authority to be a valid
consent would vicariously waive his Fourth Amendment rights.4 5 In Rodriguez, the Court acknowledged that the defendant is guaranteed, by the

37. The Supreme Court defined common authority as:
Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest
a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies third-party consent,
does not rest upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal
refinements . . . but rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize
that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own
right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might
permit the common area to be searched.
Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172 n.7 (citing Chapman v. U.S., 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Stone v. California,
376 U.S. 483 (1964)).
38. Id. at 178. The Court stated that it was not necessary to reach the issue of whether the
government had only to prove that the searching officers reasonably believed that the third party
had sufficient authority over the premises to consent to the search. Id. at 178 n.14.
39. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
40. Id. at 183-97.
41. Id. at 177.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 181 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)). The Supreme
Court noted that the third party, Gail Fischer, had moved out of the apartment almost a month
before the search in question. Id. She removed her clothing, though she left behind some furniture
and household effects. Id. She sometimes returned to spend the night, but never went to the
apartment by herself when the defendant was not home. Id. "Her name was not on the lease not
did she contribute to the rent." Id. She did have a key to the apartment, which she stated at trial
that she had taken without the defendant's knowledge. Id. Based on these facts, the Court determined
that the State had not established that Fischer had "joint access or control for most purposes" of
the defendant's apartment. Id. at 181-82.
45. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 183.
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exclusionary rule, "that no evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment will be introduced at his trial."' ' His protection under the
Fourth Amendment itself is that an unreasonable government search of
47
his house will not occur.

"There are various elements . . . that can make a search of a person's
house 'reasonable,' one of which is the consent of the person or his cotenant. ' 4s Therefore, the Court held that when a government officer
exercises his judgment regarding the facts, there is no Fourth Amendment
violation unless the officer's judgment is unreasonable.4 9 The Court determined that when a claim of apparent consent is raised, the issue is
whether one's right to be free from unreasonable searches has been
violated.50
The Rodriguez Court held that police officers may not always accept
an invitation to enter the premises.5 The determination of consent must
be judged against an objective standard.5 2 The Court cautioned: "Even
when the invitation is accompanied by an explicit assertion that the person
lives there, the surrounding circumstances could conceivably be such that
a reasonable person would doubt its truth and not act upon it without
further inquiry."53

B.

Other Jurisdictions
Following the ruling in Rodriguez, other jurisdictions have required
only that police officers reasonably believed that a third party's authority
to consent was valid.5 4 The doctrine becomes problematic when courts
try to determine what constitutes an officer's reasonable belief in a third
party's apparent authority.55 In Delaware v. Brooks,5 6 the Superior Court
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 183-84.
49. Id. at 184-85. The Court stated that the defendant was urging a requirement on the consent
exception that had not been imposed upon other elements that compel government officers to
exercise their judgment concerning the facts: "namely, the requirement that their judgment be not
only responsible but correct." Id. at 184.
50. Id. at 187.
51. Id. at 188.
52. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. The Court stated: "As with other factual determinations bearing
upon search and seizure, determination of consent to enter must 'be judged against an objective
standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment ....
Warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief' that the consenting party had authority over the premises?" Id. (quoting Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)). "If not, then warrantless entry without further inquiry is
unlawful unless authority actually exists. But if so, the search is valid." Id. at 188-89.
53. Id. at 188.
54. See, e.g., People v. Richards, 578 N.Y.S.2d 380, 383 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that tenant's
failure to regain possession of apartment constituted reasonable basis in landlord's apparent authority
to consent to search); United States v. Brown, 961 F.2d 1039, 1041 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that
officer's belief that homeowner's limited authority to enter for particular purposes gave rise to
authority to consent was a mistake of law, thereby invalidating officer's search); State v. Whitrock,
468 N.W.2d 696, 707 (Wis. 1991) (holding that officer's reliance on landlord's consent to search
tenant's apartment was reasonable because landlord represented to officers that tenant was a holdover
tenant and therefore, not in lawful possession of apartment).
55. See generally Delaware v. Brooks, Nos. IK94-04-0509 to -0512, 1994 WL 466032 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1994).
56. Id. at *1.
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of Delaware found that if there is no objective indicia of common control,
the police must make further factual inquiries."
In United States v. Whitfield,5" two FBI agents obtained verbal consent
from a mother to search her twenty-nine-year-old son's bedroom.5 9 The
court held that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. 60 It determined
that, as a factual matter, the agents could not have reasonably inferred
that the defendant's mother had common authority to permit the search. 6l
The court noted that Rodriguez held that "the Fourth Amendment does
not validate warrantless searches based on a reasonable mistake of fact,
as distinguished from a mistake of law." ' 62 The circumstances in Whitfield
were ambiguous regarding the third party's common authority. 63 Therefore, the agents were required to make further factual inquiries in order
to establish apparent authority or to procure a warrant as mandated by
the Fourth Amendment. 64
North Dakota, in contrast, has suggested that because game wardens
knew certain facts about a farmstead, they could reasonably conclude
that a third party had common authority over the premises. 65 The North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled that a third party had apparent authority
to consent under the facts as they appeared to law enforcement officials.6
Similarly, in United States v. Rosario,67 the Seventh Circuit adopted a
more lenient test for apparent authority. 68 In this case, police officers
went to investigate reports of suspicious activity at a motel room. 69 One
officer knocked on the door and a man opened it and gestured for the
officers to enter. 70 Before they entered, the officers did not determine
the man's name, identity, or relationship to the room. 7l The court ruled
that this was not dispositive on the issue of apparent authority. Rather,
the issue was whether the individual projected an aura of authority upon

57. Id. at *4. The Delaware Superior Court noted that case law since Rodriguez has been
ambiguous regarding "what constitutes a reasonable belief in a third-party's apparent authority
because reasonableness under the circumstances facing an officer in a given situation is highly factdependent." Id. at *3.
58. 939 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
59. Id. at 1073.
60. Id. at 1075.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)).
62. Whitfield, 939 F.2d at 1073. The court emphasized that "Rodriguez thus applies to situations
in which an officer would have had valid consent to search if the facts were as he reasonably
believed them to be." Id. at 1074
63. Id. at 1075.
64. Id.
65. See North Dakota v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171, 175-76 (N.D. 1995).
66. Id. North Dakota has apparently adopted a "good-reason-to-believe" standard. The North
Dakota Supreme Court did not require officers to make further factual inquiries under seemingly
ambiguous facts. Because the game wardens were not told of the third party's lack of authority
and because "[i]t is reasonable for officials to conclude the patriarch of the family, farm would
have authority over the farmstead." Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
thus allowing the seized evidence to be used against the defendant. Id.
67. 962 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1992).
68. Id. at 737.
69. Id. at 734-35.
70. Id. at 735.
71. Id.
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which one could reasonably rely. 72 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial
court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized

from the motel room."
C.

New Mexico Law
1. The Consent Exception in New Mexico
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has held that in the absence of a

warrant, but when the defendant has consented to a search, the burden
is on the prosecution to show by clear and positive evidence that the

consent was voluntarily given. 74 In State v. Valencia-Olaya,"7 a police

officer had asked twice if he could look inside the defendant's car and
the defendant had given him permission. The officer became suspicious
and removed a door panel to discover cocaine. The court of appeals
ruled that the prosecution had carried its burden of proving that the
defendant6 had voluntarily given the officer his unlimited consent to search
7
the car.

2.

Common Authority

In State v. Madrid,77 the New Mexico Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether a third party's consent to a search was valid, during
which evidence was seized to be used against the defendant in a criminal
trial. Madrid involved the validity of a wife's consent to search her
husband's residence because she was not living there at the time. The
court of appeals concluded that because furniture and personal items
belonging to the wife were there and because both she and the defendant
had keys to the residence, the wife could validly consent to a search of
the residence. 78 The New Mexico Court of Appeals based its decision on79
the fact that the wife had a sufficient relationship to the premises.
Therefore, the court held that the defendant had no reasonable expectation

72. Rosario, 962 F.2d at 738. The court added that the Fourth Amendment does not require
that an officer's belief be correct, only reasonable. Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177,
186 (1990)). The court noted that to hold differently would be to expect law enforcement officials
to perform their duties infallibly. Id.
73. Id. at 739.
74. In State v. Valencia-Olaya, 105 N.M. 690, 736 P.2d 495 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M.
689, 736 P.2d 494 (1987), the court noted that the New Mexico Supreme Court had adopted a
three-tiered analysis for determining whether a consent was voluntary:
First, there must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal
and specific. Second, the government must establish that the consent was given
without duress or coercion. Finally, we view the first two elements with a presumption
against waiver of constitutional rights.
Id. at 694, 736 P.2d at 499 (citing United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1985)).
75. 105 N.M. 690, 736 P.2d 495 (Ct. App.), cert. denied-, 105 N.M. 689, 736 P.2d 494 (1987).
76. See id. at 694-95, 736 P.2d at 499-500.
77. 91 N.M. 375, 574 P.2d 594 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 491, 576 P.2d 297 (1978).
78. See id. at 378, 574 P.2d at 597.
79. Id. at 378, 574 P.2d at 587. The court noted that the wife had a right to occupy the
premises, had a key, used the premises to an extent, and left some of her things there. Id.
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of exclusive use of the premise.80 Likewise, in State v. Hensel 8 the New
Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed that the authority which validates
third-party consent does not rest on the property interest that the third
party has in the premises to be searched.8 2 Rather, the Court determined
that the third party's authority to consent rests "on the mutual use of
the property by individuals having joint access or control" for most
purposes .83
3. New Mexico Constitution-Article II, Section 10 Jurisprudence
In a line of cases, beginning in 1989, the New Mexico Supreme Court
has afforded defendants more protection under Article II, Section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution than is afforded by its federal counterpart,
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 84 In State v.
Gutierrez,85 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that it is the court's
duty to enforce the constitutional guarantee of freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure:
Denying the government the fruits of unconstitutional conduct at trial
best effectuates the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches
and seizures by preserving the rights of the accused to the same extent
86
as if the government's officers had stayed within the law.

It is in this context that the New Mexico Court of Appeals decided
Wright.
IV.

RATIONALE OF THE WRIGHT COURT

In State v. Wright,87 the New Mexico Court of Appeals considered
whether the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress

80. Id.
81. 106 N.M. 8, 738 P.2d 126 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 105 N.M. 720, 737 P.2d 79, cert. denied,
484 U.S. 958 (1987).
82. Id. at 10, 738 P.2d at 128.
83. Id. (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7)
84. See, e.g., State v. Cordova 109 N.M. 211, 214, 784 P.2d 30, 33 (1989) (holding that New
Mexico requires a valid warrant affidavit to meet a two-prong test: 1) a substantial basis for
believing the informant; and 2) a substantial basis for concluding that the informant gathered the
information of illegal activity in a reliable fashion). New Mexico rejected the more lenient test set
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Cordova 109 N.M. at
216-17, 784 P.2d at 35-36. See also State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993) (holding
that the "good-faith" exception to the federal exclusionary rule was incompatible with state constitutional protections); Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994) (holding that a
warrantless public arrest must be based upon both probable cause and sufficient exigent circumstances,
rejecting the more lenient federal rule set forth in U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976)).
85. 116 N.M. 431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993).
86. Id. at 446, 863 P.2d at 1067. See also YALE KAmisAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE, & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 5, at 58-59 (8th ed. 1994) (discussing the reaction of state
courts determined to provide the accused with greater protections under state law than is said to
be provided under the Federal Constitution by construing "a state constitutional provision more
expansively than the United States Supreme Court has interpreted a textually identical or parallel
provision of the Federal Bill of Rights.").
87. State v. Wright, 119 N.M. 559, 893 P.2d 455 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 119 N.M. 389, 890
P.2d 1321 (1995).
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evidence following a warrantless search of a bedroom occupied by the
defendant and her boyfriend in the home of a third person. The court
of appeals addressed a question of first impression in New Mexico:
whether "an individual clothed with apparent authority to consent to a
search may give lawful consent to law enforcement officers to enter and
search the premises owned by another .... "88 The State conceded that
Wertz did not have actual authority to consent to the officers' entry
into the trailer and the bedroom.89 Nevertheless, the State argued that
Wertz possessed apparent authority to consent to the entry and subsequent
search.90
The State asserted that the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v. Rodriguez supported this claim. 91 The court of appeals acknowledged that in determining apparent authority the United States
Supreme Court applied an objective standard; nevertheless, it rejected
this argument. 92 The Wright court stated, "the State's reliance on the
officers' subjective belief that Wertz had 'apparent authority' to give
consent to search the residence and the bedroom occupied by defendant
and Corman runs counter to the provisions of Article II, Section 10 of
the New Mexico Constitution." 93
The Wright court relied on the New Mexico Supreme Court's rationale
in State v. Gutierrez.94 "An individual's right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico
Constitution precludes the erosion of such right by a 'good faith' exception
as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
Leon . . . . 9 The Wright court concluded "that where the State relies
upon consent to justify a warrantless search of a residence, there is no
'apparent authority' exception under Article II, Section 10 of the New
Mexico Constitution.' )96
Additionally, the State argued that the defendant lacked a legitimate
expectation of privacy in both the trailer and the bedroom; thus she did
not have standing to challenge the officers' search. 97 The court of appeals

88. Id. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460. See also State v. Munoz, 111 N.M. 118, 119, 802 P.2d 23,
24 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M. 136, 802 P.2d 645 (1990) (declining to reach the question
of whether a warrantless entry is valid when based on the consent of a party whom the police at
the time of the entry reasonably believed to possess common authority over the premises).
89. See Wright, 119 N.M. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460.
90. Id. See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
91. Wright, 119 N.M. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id. In Gutierrez, the court held that evidence obtained by virtue of an invalid search
warrant may not be admitted under the exclusionary rule's "good faith" exception. State v. Gutierrez,
116 N.M. 431, 446-47, 863 P.2d 1052, 1067-68 (1993). The "good faith" exception provides that
whenever an officer executes a search pursuant to a warrant that is later proved invalid, the officer's
"good faith" belief in the warrant would preserve otherwise excludable evidence. Id. at 437, 863
P.2d at 1058. See also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (acknowledging a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule).
95. Wright, 119 N.M. at 564, 893 P.2d at 461.
96. Id. at 565, 893 P.2d at 461.
97. See id. at 562, 893 P.2d at 458.
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set forth a two-pronged test to determine whether an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy: 1) by his or her conduct, has the
individual demonstrated an actual expectation of privacy; and 2) "is the
person's subjective expectation one that society recognizes as reasonable." 9 s The court rejected the State's argument that the defendant lacked
standing because the prosecution failed to prove that she was an overnight
guest. 99

The Wright court determined that the State's reliance on a United
States Supreme Court case, Minnesota v. Olson,"°° was misguided.' 0 In
Olson,' the Supreme Court held that an individual's status as a house
guest is sufficient to confer standing to challenge the warrantless entry
by police. 0 2 The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined, however,
that Olson did not hold that an individual's status as an overnight guest
is a condition precedent to the right to assert a legitimate expectation
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 0 3
Moreover, the Wright court stated that the framers of Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution did not intend an individual's
freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures to be so narrowly
construed.' °4 Because the defendant was in the bedroom with the door
closed and with the permission of the owner, the court concluded that
she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bedroom. 0 5 The court
of appeals also disagreed with the State's reliance on State v. Hensel.'06
Finally, the court distinguished United States v. Rosario,0 7 by acknowledging that the defendant in Rosario had rented a hotel room with
another person, thereby making the defendant's expectation of privacy
contingent on the decisions of the consenting party.' °8 Following this
same reasoning, the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in a bedroom with the door
closed could not be surrendered, except in the case of a co-occupant of
the bedroom. 0 9 The Wright court concluded that the trial court should
98. Id. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459. Compare State v. Esguerra, 113 N.M. 310, 313, 825 P.2d 243,
246 (Ct. App. 1991) (stating that one who owns, controls, or lawfully possesses property has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in that property protected by the Fourth Amendment) with State
v. Hensel, 106 N.M. 8, 9, 738 P.2d 126, 127 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that mere presence on the

premises is not enough to convey a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises).
99. Wright, 119 N.M. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459.
100. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
101. See Wright, 119 N.M. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459.

102. See id.(citing Olson, 495 U.S. at 98-99).
103.

Wright, 119 N.M. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459.

104. Id. See Gutierrez, 116 N.M. at 440, 863 P.2d at 1061 (stating that the New Mexico Supreme
Court had "demonstrated a willingness to undertake independent analysis of our state constitutional
guarantees when federal law begins to encroach on the sanctity of those guarantees.").
105. See Wright, 119 N.M. at 563-64, 893 P.2d at 459-60.

106. See id. at 563, 893 P.2d at 559. The Wright court noted that in Hensel there was evidence
that the defendant did not have permission to be on the premises, but in the present case, the
State had conceded that the defendant had permission to enter the trailer and occupy the bedroom.
Id.
107. 962 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1992).

108. See Wright, 119 N.M. at 563, 893 P.2d at 459 (citing Rosario, 962 F.2d at 737).
109. Id. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460.
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have granted the motion to suppress the contraband discovered in the
bedroom and on the defendant." 0
V.

ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS

The court of appeals' decision in Wright is the most recent in a series
of cases in which New Mexico construes its search and seizure provision
to accord defendants more protection than the federal courts accord under
the Fourth Amendment."' The court of appeals' willingness to reject the
federal apparent authority exception should be commended. The apparent
authority exception unnecessarily broadens the consent exception to the
warrant requirement.
The Wright court provides little rationale in the opinion for its decision
to reject the apparent authority exception. Nevertheless, the policy underscored by the Wright decision is correct. The New Mexico Court of
Appeals demonstrates its unwillingness to defer to law enforcement officials by rejecting the further factual inquiry required by the federal
apparent authority exception.1 2 The federal exception requires that the
court go through a factual analysis to determine if the third party's
consent is valid. If it is found invalid, the court must determine from
the subjective perceptions of the officer whether she could have reasonably
believed that the third party possessed authority to consent to a search." 3
The confusion in other jurisdictions over how to determine when the
is one important imsubjective perception of an officer is reasonable
4
plication avoided by the Wright decision.1
After State v. Gutierrez, in which the New Mexico Supreme Court
held that an officer's "good faith" belief in a search warrant that later
proved invalid would not preserve otherwise excludable evidence," 5 it
would have been difficult for the New Mexico Court of Appeals to
uphold the federal apparent authority to consent doctrine. New Mexico
16
has supported the dissenting Justices' view in Illinois v. Rodriguez."
The underlying rationale for allowing third-party-consent searches is that
a "person may voluntarily limit his expectation of privacy by allowing
others to exercise authority over his premises.""17 In Wright, the court
held that as a matter of law, the defendant had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the bedroom that could not be surrendered except in the

110. Id. at 565, 893 P.2d at 461.
Ill. See Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (1994); State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M.
431, 863 P.2d 1052 (1993); State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211, 784 P.2d 30 (1989).
112. See Wright, 119 N.M. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460.
113. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
114. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 97.
116. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 189-98 (Marshall, Brennan, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
117. Id. at 190. The dissent stated that "an individual's decision to permit another 'joint access
(quoting United States v. Matlock, 415
[to] or control [over the property] for most purposes;'
U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)) "limits that person's 'reasonable expectation of privacy and to that extent
limits his Fourth Amendment protections."' Id.
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case of a co-occupant of the bedroom."' Therefore, the defendant's
Article II, Section 10 protections were only limited to that extent. The
court of appeals would not allow unlawfully obtained evidence to be
admitted at trial no matter how reasonable the officer's beliefs were that
the third party possessed the authority to consent. 119
In State v. Gutierrez, the New Mexico Supreme Court focused on New
Mexico's constitutional guarantees. 120 The New Mexico courts must be
encouraged to continue to undertake independent analysis of the New
Mexico Constitution because the United States Supreme Court continues
to be unwilling to limit law enforcement's discretionary power,'12 which
allows the police to become "judges in their own cause."'122 Although
there is undoubtedly an argument that only the guilty are protected by
the Wright court's decision, in fact, the Wright decision affords to all
of New Mexico's citizens what is guaranteed to them by Article II,
Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.
The Wright decision demonstrates that New Mexico will continue to
protect its citizens from the trend in the United States Supreme Court
of the free-floating Zreation of "reasonable exceptions to the warrant
requirement. ' '123 The New Mexico Court of Appeals has enforced its

mandate to exclude any evidence that is unlawfully obtained. If a third
party did not have the necessary actual authority to consent to a search,
the consent is invalid, the search is unlawful, and the evidence must be
excluded. The evidence seized at the trailer may have resulted in the
defendant's conviction. Nevertheless, in New Mexico, a person will not
be convicted at any cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Wright decision held that the State may not justify warrantless
searches by the apparent authority of a third party to consent. Although
the Wright decision would have been more helpful if the court had
expanded its discussion of its reasoning for invalidating the apparent
authority to consent exception in New Mexico, the law in New Mexico
pertaining to third-party consent is clear. Despite the fact that evidence
needed to convict may be excluded, if the third-party consent is found

118. Wright, 119 N.M. at 564, 893 P.2d at 460.
119. Id. at 565, 893 P.2d at 461.
120. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
121. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 197 (The dissent noted that precedent has demonstrated that
third-party consent searches are constitutional only because they rest on consent by a party empowered
to do so.).
122. See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 197, 213-214 (1993) (citing Jacob W. Landynski, In Search of Justice Black's Fourth Amendment,
45 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 462 (1976)).
123. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 198. The Rodriguez dissent noted that:
Instead of judging the validity of consent searches, as we have in the past, based
on whether a defendant has in fact limited his expectation of privacy, the Court
today carves out an additional exception to the warrant requirement for third party
consent searches ....
Id. at 197. See also Maclin, supra note 122, at 228-29.
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to be invalid, then the subsequent search and seizure are also invalid.
With this decision New Mexico reaffirms its mandate to analyze the New
Mexico Constitution independently of federal law when federal law encroaches upon the rights of New Mexico's citizens.
KATHLEEN M. WILSON

